Micron Document




Total Package Procurement
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Total Package Procurement (TPP or alternatively TPPC) was a major systems acquisition policy introduced in the United States Department of Defense in the mid-1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara.cite-ref-dtc-1-0[1] It was conceived by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, Robert H. Charles.cite-ref-williams-4-2-0[2]

TPP involves combining as a single package for the procurement a number of related requirements including the design, development, production and support of major systems.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-0[3] This concept was a "pendulum reaction" to the prior cost reimbursement policies in major weapon systems.cite-ref-psad-80-39-p1-4-0[4]

Total Package Procurement was not successful and was abandoned shortly after MacNamara left office.cite-ref-psad-80-39-p2-5-0[5]cite-ref-brown-6-0[6]

Contents


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Description

TPP is a method of procuring at the outset of the acquisition phase under a single contract containing price, performance and schedule commitments, the maximum practical amount of design, development, production and support needed to introduce and sustain a system or component in the inventory.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-1[3]

The purpose of TPP was to procure under the influence of competition as much of the total design, development, production and support requirements for a system or component as may be practicable thereby:

• Providing firmer 5-year force structure program package planning information concerning performance cost and schedules.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-2[3]
• Discouraging contractors from buying in on the design and development effort with the intention of recovering on the subsequent production program.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-3[3]
• Permitting program decision and source selection based on binding performance price and schedule commitments by contractors for the total program or major part of it.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-4[3]
• Providing a firmer basis for projecting total acquisition and operational costs for use in source selection and in the determination of appropriate contractual incentives.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-5[3]
• Motivating contractors to design initially for economical production and support of operational hardware which may not receive sufficient emphasis in the absence of productions commitments.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-6[3]
• Requiring contractors to assume more responsibility for program success thereby permitting the Government to monitor programs more in terms of surveillance and less in terms of detailed management.cite-ref-cfr-63-3-7[3]

Results

Total Package Procurement did not succeed.cite-ref-psad-80-39-p2-5-1[5] The unique complexity of shipbuilding made Total Package Procurement particularly inappropriate for these programs.cite-ref-psad-80-39-p2-5-2[5]

Notable programs that encountered major problems with the TPP approach were the Air Force's Lockheed C-5 Galaxycite-ref-dtc-1-1[1] and AGM-69 SRAM,cite-ref-backfire-7-0[7] the Army's Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne,cite-ref-backfire-7-1[7] the Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships (LHA),cite-ref-psad-80-39-p2-5-3[5] and the Spruance-class destroyers.cite-ref-psad-80-39-p2-5-4[5]

Elimination

Upon taking office as Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1970, David Packard issued a May 28, 1970 memorandum that contained a number of major reforms designed to address "the real mess we have on our hands." A key reform was elimination of TPP except in rare situations.cite-ref-brown-6-1[6]

References

cite-note-dtc-11. citerefmichaelswood1989Michaels, Jack V.; Wood, William P. (1989). Design to Cost. John Wiley & Sons. p. 238. ISBN 0471609005. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
cite-note-williams-4-22. citerefwilliams1999Williams, Michael D. (1999). Acquisition for the 21st century: the F-22 Development Program. National Defense University Press. p. 4. ISBN 9781428990876. Retrieved 6 January 2016.
cite-note-cfr-63-33. Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1 January 1969. p. 63. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
cite-note-psad-80-39-p1-44. Two Navy Ship Contracts Modified By Public Law 850804 -- Status As Of July 29, 1979 (PDF). Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office. 29 July 1979. p. 1. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
cite-note-psad-80-39-p2-55. Two Navy Ship Contracts Modified By Public Law 850804 -- Status As Of July 29, 1979 (PDF). Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office. 29 July 1979. p. 2. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
cite-note-brown-66. citerefbrown2005Brown, Shannon A. (2005). Providing the Means of War: Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition. US Army Center of Military History and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. pp. 145–146. ISBN 9780160876219. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
cite-note-backfire-77. "Pentagon Buying System Backfires". Beaver County Times. United Press International. 3 July 1969. Retrieved 5 January 2016.